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In CLM 32, we examined how both Chinese and outside observers look at 
China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage, that is, the purely 
perceptual dimensions of the issue. In CLM 34, we assessed whether, to 
what extent, and in what manner the Chinese government is becoming 
more assertive in defining and promoting the concept of “core interests.” 
 
 The primary focus of this essay, as indicated in CLM 34, is Chinese 
assertiveness concerning U.S. political and military behavior along 
China’s maritime periphery. This topic inevitably also concerns Chinese 
behavior toward Japan, South Korea, and some ASEAN nations, given 
their status as both close security allies of the United States and maritime 
nations whose actions toward Beijing influence U.S. interests in the region 
(e.g., peace, stability, and freedom of navigation). Thus, this paper will 
examine Chinese actions along China’s entire maritime periphery, from 
the Yellow Sea to the South China Sea, with regard to both disputed and 
undisputed maritime areas, as well as those recent official PRC diplomatic 
statements and legal submissions of relevance to such maritime behavior.  
 
 The primary purpose of such an examination is: a) to assess whether, 
to what degree, and in what major ways China has become more assertive 
along its maritime periphery in recent years; b) to examine the external 
and internal forces motivating China to become more or less assertive over 
time; and c) to assess the prospects for Chinese assertiveness with regard 
to maritime sovereignty issues in the future.  
 
 The essay will examine what have been regarded by outside observers 
as the most potentially troubling Chinese actions and diplomatic or legal 
statements with regard to territorial issues taken along China’s maritime 
periphery since approximately 2007–2008, when concern with a more 
“assertive” China was emerging in the West and elsewhere (see CLM 32). 
These encompass five major issue areas: 1) legal and diplomatic 
submissions, statements, and governmental actions with regard to the 
South China Sea; 2) diplomatic statements and governmental actions with 
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regard to the East China Sea; 3) legal statements and actions concerning 
China’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); and 4) diplomatic, 
official, and media statements and actions with regard to the Yellow Sea. 
 
 For each issue area, the essay will: 1) provide as accurate a summary 
as possible from open sources of the major relevant Chinese behavior that 
has occurred since 2007–2008; 2) assess whether such behavior represents 
an increase or decrease in frequency and type or intensity compared to 
earlier years; and 3) examine the larger external and domestic context 
surrounding such Chinese behavior, to determine the apparent motives and 
objectives at work and the reasons for apparent changes in level and 
intensity over time. The essay will conclude with an assessment of the 
significance of and future prospects for Chinese assertiveness in the 
maritime realm derived from the preceding analysis. 
 
A Definition 
Any such assessment must begin with a clear definition of Chinese “assertiveness” 
regarding maritime issues. As indicated in CLM 34, assertiveness can encompass many 
types of activities and statements; some can be very beneficial and others highly 
detrimental to U.S. interests. In this CLM, the primary focus is on Chinese official or 
governmental behavior and statements that might appear to threaten U.S. and/or allied 
interests or otherwise challenge the status quo in maritime Asia along China’s periphery, 
thereby undermining Asian stability and causing concern to U.S. and Asian leaders. 
 
The South China Sea: An Unchanged Strategy, But Greater 
Activism, Largely in Reaction to Others 
Legal and diplomatic statements and submissions 
During the past two plus years, China has formally presented a justification of its 
longstanding territorial claims in the South China Sea, as part of a formal process 
administered by the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) involving the 
submission of technical information in support of claims to extended maritime 
continental shelf rights.2  
 
 China’s stance was contained in three documents: a note verbale to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and a preliminary declaration of claims to an extended 
continental shelf, both submitted in May 2009; and a second note verbale, submitted to 
the UN in April 2011.3 
 
 In the first document, Beijing stated that it “has indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands of the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” Chinese 
officials subsequently repeated versions of this statement in 2010 and 2011.4  
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 The document also contained the well-known map of the region that includes the 
“nine-dashed line” (jiuduanxian, 九段线). First produced by the Nationalist Chinese 
government in 1947, this map shows nine dashes or hash marks that form a U shape 
around all the islands of the South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly islands. 
Some of these dashes lie close to the coasts of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
This submission was the first time that China had presented a map to the UN in support 
of its claims, but it was certainly not the first map produced in China depicting the dotted 
line.5  
 
 The second document asserted China’s “right to make submissions on the outer 
limits of the continental shelf that extends beyond 200 nautical miles in the East China 
Sea and in other sea areas.” It also included maps and topographical baseline details, 
dealing almost exclusively with the East China Sea. However, as indicated in the above 
language, the document reserved China’s right to submit claims “in other sea areas.” This 
presumably includes the South China Sea, especially its northern portions off the coasts 
of Hainan Island and Guangzhou Province, which are not under dispute.6 
 
 The third document (the April 2011 note verbale) again repeated much of the content 
of the 2009 note verbale, but used more detailed language. Indeed, it was more specific 
than any previous communication to the UN on the subject.7 As one expert describes it, 
China “stated—for the first time—that the islands are entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ and 
continental shelf.”8  
 
 Some observers argue that these three official Chinese documents represent a more 
assertive stance toward maritime sovereignty claims, considering the abovementioned 
language in the note verbale claiming indisputable sovereignty, and the submission of a 
map with the nine-dashed line, as well as the subsequent statement of intentions to claim 
an extended continental shelf in the East China Sea and possibly other areas.9 Indeed, for 
some observers, the perception was created by these documents that “China was 
escalating the dispute and expanding its claim.”10 
 
 However, such an argument seems problematic in several respects. First, the 
submission of the three documents did not constitute new, unilateral actions by China. 
They were all taken in response to requests for information made by the UN with specific 
deadlines or in reaction to the actions of other nations. The first document was a reaction 
to submissions to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf made by 
Malaysia and Vietnam, which were in turn submitted in response to a UN deadline for 
nations to provide technical information on claims to extended continental shelves (ECS) 
beyond 200 nautical miles (the breadth of the Exclusive Economic Zone [EEZ] claimed 
by nations). Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines all submitted claims to areas in the 
South China Sea that overlap with China’s claims.11 The second document was submitted 
in response to a UN request to present claims for ECS by May 13, 2009.12 The third 
document (i.e., the note verbale of April 2011) was submitted in response to a note 
verbale submitted by the Philippines in April 2011 objecting to China’s May 2009 note 
verbale and the dotted-line map.13 In short, a deadline established by the UN created “a 
moment for states to issue claims, counter-claims, and counter counter-claims.”14 
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 Second, most of the wording employed in the May 2009 note verbale is congruent 
with China’s longstanding position on the issue. In particular, the first phrase (“China has 
indisputable sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and the adjacent 
waters”) has been the standard answer of the Chinese government for decades, predating 
the May 2009 note verbale since at least the 1970s.15 
 
 However, the second phrase of the statement in the 2009 note verbale (“and enjoys 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and 
subsoil thereof”) does not appear to be a standard phrase employed regularly in the past 
by the Chinese government, despite the fact that the document asserts that the positions 
described by both phrases have been “consistently held by the Chinese Government,” and 
are “widely known by the international community.”16 At the same time, the references to 
“seabed and subsoil” were not entirely new. Instead, they are consistent with similar 
language in China’s1998 exclusive economic zone law, which was passed to harmonize 
China’s domestic legal regime with UNCLOS. 
 
 Third, as some very knowledgeable analysts of this issue argue, although it does 
arguably provide some clarification on China’s existing territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, China’s 2009 note verbale almost certainly does not expand those claims.17 
Based on language found in UNCLOS, the wording of that document contained in the 
first phrase cited above (“indisputable sovereignty”) suggests that China claims 
sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and the standard 12-nautical-mile 
territorial sea around the islands. The wording in the second phrase cited above (“and 
enjoys sovereign rights”) indicates a Chinese claim to the EEZ and, if applicable,18 an 
extended continental shelf measured from the islands.19  
 
 Such areas certainly do not extend beyond the hash marks on the 1947 map, and 
almost certainly do not include all the waters inside those marks. Indeed, the geographic 
extent of China’s maritime sovereignty claims as suggested in the 2009 note verbale 
could vary significantly from island to island, depending on whether a specific island or 
other formation is entitled to an EEZ and a continental shelf of its own. Many such 
geographic features almost certainly are not entitled to such extensive maritime territory, 
according to UNCLOS, because they are mere “rocks” and not islands.20 Nevertheless, as 
a single island can hypothetically generate an EEZ of approximately 125,000 square 
nautical miles, China would likely be able to claim maritime rights to much of the South 
China Sea under UNCLOS from the features that could be classified as islands and thus 
be entitled to a 200nm EEZ (e.g., Woody Island [held by China] in the Paracels as well as 
Spratly Island [held by Vietnam] and Itu Aba [held by Taiwan] in the Spratlys).21 
 
 Thus, even though China appeared more assertive in submitting a map with the 
infamous nine-dashed line in its note to the UN, it has not defined its claims as 
encompassing all the waters contained within those lines. Indeed, as Fravel states: “only 
one interpretation [of the dotted line] is consistent with China’s diplomatic statements 
and actions: the line depicts China’s claim to the island groups contained within the line, 
namely, the Paracels and the Spratlys” [emphasis added].22  
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 Moreover, as one analyst observes, the fact that China’s claim as expressed in the 
note verbale, along with those of other claimants, are all presented in the context of 
UNCLOS definitions of maritime claims, “establishes a common framework which 
should make it easier to explore possible solutions.”23 This potentially undermines the 
views of those in China and elsewhere who might seek to arbitrarily or recklessly 
advance maritime claims based solely on independent criteria.24 
 
 Indeed, most recently, Beijing has reinforced the impression that it wishes to manage 
its claims to disputed territories in the South China Sea on the basis of common 
international criteria by continuing to support the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea (DOC) signed between ASEAN and China in 2002.25 
Specifically, since late 2010, Beijing has been participating in efforts to draft and 
negotiate a more binding Code of Conduct, as called for by the DOC, largely via the 
ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.26  
 
 While such efforts have thus far shown sporadic progress at best—in part because of 
China’s longstanding objection to any procedures or actions that resemble a multilateral 
approach to resolving the territorial disputes27—in fall 2010, Beijing reportedly indicated 
that it was “open to different formulas and initiatives,” thus signaling increased 
flexibility.28 China’s increased support for efforts to establish a formal Code of Conduct 
was acknowledged by U.S. officials.29  
 
Activities Presumably Undertaken in Support of China’s Claims  
In recent years, Beijing has undertaken a variety of activities to defend its claims over 
territories and waters in the South China Sea. The most important of these include: 1) the 
imposition and expansion of an annual unilateral fishing ban (in the northern part of the 
area); 2) regular maritime security patrols (primarily conducted by the Chinese Fisheries 
Administration and State Oceanographic Administration, and sometimes involving the 
detention of Vietnamese fishermen and the cutting of cables of survey ships); 3) various 
forms of political and diplomatic pressure (including demarches and planting markers on 
unoccupied reefs); and 4) the conducting of scientific activities and extensive naval 
exercises in the vicinity. By and large, these activities have increased in number (or 
duration) and intensity over the last several years.  
 
 The annual unilateral fishing ban to replenish rapidly shrinking fishing stocks began 
in June 1999 and usually occurred in June and July. It initially did not include foreign 
boats. However, in 2009, the length of the ban increased and the policy was apparently 
expanded to include foreign boats. This change coincided with an increase in the 
detention of Vietnamese fishermen.30 
 
 Maritime security patrols or “cruises” (xunhang, 巡航) by vessels from the Fisheries 
Administration first began in China’s EEZ in around 2000 (after the passage of China’s 
1998 EEZ law). In 2005, new regulations were issued to strengthen and standardize the 
activities of Fisheries Administration vessels in China’s EEZs, resulting in a more regular 
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deployment of such vessels in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Although complete 
data on the scope and frequency of these cruises over time is unavailable, it appears that 
Fisheries Administration vessels, usually consisting of a pair of ships, are deployed to the 
region approximately seven or eight times per year, based on data from 2008.31 
 
 As part of their duty to enforce fishing laws and demonstrate sovereignty, China’s 
maritime security patrols (primarily involving Fisheries Administration vessels) 
apparently detained an increasing number of Vietnamese fishermen between 2005 and 
2009; however, the number of detentions appears to have dropped since then. There are 
no reports of China detaining and holding Vietnamese fishermen in 2011, but Chinese 
patrols are still confiscating the catches of Vietnamese vessels that operate in the waters 
near the Paracels. Chinese maritime patrol vessels have also on occasion shot at and 
rammed Vietnamese and Philippine vessels.32 
 
 However, in the first half of 2011, China’s maritime patrols have apparently begun 
targeting hydrocarbon seismic exploration vessels, while previously they had focused 
primarily on fishing boats. These increased patrols have resulted in clashes with 
Philippine and Vietnamese ships that some observers identify as evidence of a 
significantly more assertive posture. Moreover, China has built an advanced deep-water 
oil rig for use in the South China Sea, though it has not yet been used to conduct drilling 
in disputed waters. While it could be used in the future to drill in disputed southern areas 
of the South China Sea, it is also very possible that the rig will be located in undisputed 
deep water closer to China’s coast, where oil resources have been located.33 
 
 The PLA Navy (PLAN) has also conducted regular patrols in the disputed waters of 
the South China Sea since approximately 2005, although the frequency and type of ship 
involved are largely unknown. In addition, since the start of escort missions in the Gulf of 
Aden in December 2008, each flotilla has transited through the South China Sea, often 
stopping near some of the Chinese-held reefs.34 
 
 Information regarding Chinese naval exercises is difficult to gather because it is not 
reported systematically in the Chinese media. However, in the past few years, the 
frequency and scope of exercises in the area have apparently increased, and include 
exercises in disputed areas. In particular, some exercises in the region now cover longer 
distances, include ships from all three of China’s fleets, and encompass a wide number of 
activities, such as opposition-force, live-fire drills, counterterrorism, search and rescue, 
and coral reef assault operations, among others. Last year witnessed a large number of 
high-profile exercises, including relatively large task forces, advanced ships, missile 
launches, and amphibious landings. There have also been reports of long-range naval 
aviation exercises from Nanjing and Guangzhou that incorporate radar jamming, night 
flying, mid-air refueling, and simulated bombing runs in the South China Sea.35 Although 
many of these exercises occur in parts of the South China Sea that are undisputed, namely 
the waters south of Guangzhou Province and around Hainan Island, they bolster China’s 
ability to signal its resolve to defend its claims because media reports describe them as 
taking place at an undisclosed location in these waters.  
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 As indicated in CLM 33, many observers cite the above Chinese activities in the 
South China Sea as a prime example of Beijing’s greater assertiveness in recent years and 
months. In many cases, the implication is that China has in some fundamental sense 
altered its strategy and approach to managing its maritime claims in that region, from an 
emphasis on negotiation to an increasing reliance on coercion and a use of force, thus 
presumably threatening the U.S. interest in a peaceful resolution of the disputes.36 
 
 As the above summary of China’s actions clearly indicates, there is little doubt that 
China has increased its overall presence and deployed a greater number of more 
sophisticated military, Fisheries Administration, and State Oceanographic Administration 
marine surveillance vessels in the South China Sea since roughly 2005. Beijing has also 
on occasion taken more direct action against other claimants, for example, by detaining 
Vietnamese fisherman, expanding a fishing moratorium, and cutting seismic survey 
cables. In most cases, however, these activities, as with the above formal legal 
submissions, have taken place in response to what China views as growing and more 
assertive challenges to its claim occurring since roughly 2007, challenges that require a 
response in turn.37 These challenges from Beijing’s perspective are listed in a table in the 
attached appendix.  
 
 For example, when the Philippine Congress passed an archipelagic baseline law in 
February 2009, China declared publicly in March 2009 that one purpose of patrols by 
vessels from the Fisheries Administration was to “demonstrate sovereignty.” More 
generally, China has sought to grapple with Vietnam’s declared strategy of 
internationalizing the dispute launched at the end of 2009, namely, efforts to draw 
attention to and support from the international community for Vietnam’s claims. China’s 
series of naval exercises in the South China Sea in 2010 were perhaps one response to 
Vietnam’s strategy. Finally, Chinese fishermen are also detained and shot at by vessels 
from other states in these waters, and vessels licensed by other Southeast Asian nations 
also regularly conduct seismic surveys and oil drilling in the disputed waters.38  
 
 In addition to responding to such activism by other claimants, China’s greater 
presence and activism are to some extent a logical consequence of its increasing 
capabilities. It is acquiring more numbers and improved types of vessels capable of 
supporting its existing position and is deploying them accordingly. Taken together, the 
resulting behavior can be considered a form of greater assertiveness, but it is certainly not 
unique overall among the claimants in the South China Sea, and it is not being 
undertaken to forcibly resolve the disputes on Beijing’s terms. In other words, Beijing is 
displaying a greater capability to support its longstanding approach of deferring 
settlements while actively defending its claims from challenges by other states. 
 
The East China Sea: Nationalism-fueled Confrontations and 
Disputes, but Clear Limits to Assertiveness 
In recent years, China’s (largely military) presence in the East China Sea has clearly 
increased. In particular, PLAN warships have entered and exited the East China Sea 
through narrow seas between Japanese islands on several occasions since 2004.
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such waters are regarded as high seas and thus open for passage under UNCLOS, these 
transits have been regarded with concern by the Japanese government. Some of these 
deployments were unprecedented in the number and sophistication of the ships involved, 
and signaled a clear increase in China’s ability to operate naval vessels in a coordinated 
manner over much further distances from home.39  
 
 Also, several incidents have occurred between Chinese aircraft or naval vessels and 
Japanese vessels, some in disputed waters within the East China Sea. For example, in 
January 2005, Chinese destroyers reportedly crisscrossed the Chunxiao gas and oil fields. 
When the Japanese protested this and other such deployments of military vessels, 
“Beijing argued that these were normal exercises in its waters.”40 In 2010, a Chinese 
helicopter involved in military exercises near Japanese waters buzzed a Japanese naval 
vessel twice, while a Chinese ship chased a Japanese coast guard vessel that Tokyo says 
was conducting marine surveys.41 A similar incident occurred when a Chinese helicopter 
flew close to a Japanese destroyer in March 2011, prompting a formal Japanese protest.42 
China has also continued drilling in the Kashi/Tianwaitan gas field, which Japan claimed 
was a violation of the 2008 consensus on joint development in the East China Sea.43 
 
 In September 2010, Beijing took a very aggressive diplomatic stance toward Tokyo 
in reaction to Japan’s arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain on suspicion of 
intentionally ramming his vessel into Japan Coast Guard ships near the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Beijing initially protested the Japanese decision to seize the 
Chinese fishing vessel and hold the captain and crew, and then markedly intensified its 
response after Tokyo decided to hold the captain (after releasing the rest of the crew) and 
announced that it would investigate the incident. China’s response included a variety of 
actions, some quite aggressive.44 In addition, after Japan released the captain of the 
Chinese fishing boat, Beijing, rather than moving to defuse the tensions, requested that 
Tokyo apologize for detaining him and pay compensation. Tokyo refused to apologize, 
and demanded that China pay for repairs to the Japanese coast guard boats damaged in 
the collision.45  
 
 As in the case of activities in the South China Sea, many observers regard China’s 
recent actions in the East China Sea, including those in or near areas disputed with Japan, 
as clearly more assertive than in the past, and even aggressive. Beijing is viewed by some 
as asserting its military presence in the region in a major way, thereby altering the status 
quo in potentially troubling directions, with little explanation or warning.46 And China’s 
handling of the September 2010 collision was viewed by many observers as excessive 
and provocative. 
 
 In fact, as in the South China Sea, Chinese behavior again reflects the combined 
influence of increasing capabilities in support of long-held national objectives and 
responses to actions regarded as provocative or unprecedented. However, arguably even 
more than in the case of the South China Sea, China’s reaction to at least some activities 
in the East China Sea involving Tokyo are particularly influenced by strong nationalistic 
sentiments toward Japan. 
 
Swaine & Fravel, China Leadership Monitor, no. 35 
 9 
 Recent PLAN deployments through East China Sea waters near Japanese territory 
clearly reflect the increasing capacity of China’s navy to operate in blue water regions 
along its periphery. Many of the deployments near Japan have been part of longer 
voyages into the western Pacific or southward, to the South China Sea and beyond. There 
is no question that such activities, as with many PLAN actions in other nearby maritime 
regions, reflect Beijing’s desire to employ its growing military capabilities to support its 
territorial claims in disputed waters, defend its interpretation of its EEZ, and more 
generally strengthen its presence in the western Pacific, as a sign of its increasing ability 
to promote its interests in that vital region.47  
 
 Whether one regards such activities as troublingly “assertive” depends on one’s 
assessment of the likely motives and impact of China’s actions.48 Such naval 
deployments are certainly “modest in scale compared to U.S. naval operations.” 49 But 
they are also altering the distribution of forces in the western Pacific to unpredictable 
ends, and supporting claims (in the case of the EEZ) that are opposed by many other 
nations, thereby causing real concern in the U.S. and Japan. At the very least, by bringing 
more military capabilities into or near disputed waters, such increased deployments could 
raise the likelihood of incidents or crises, or perhaps even eventually increase China’s 
willingness to employ military force to handle territorial disputes. And this likelihood is 
increased further, particularly with regard to disputes in the East China Sea, by the fact 
that acute nationalist sensitivities toward Japan exist among the Chinese public. Such 
sensitivities can exert significant pressure on China’s leaders at critical moments. 
 
 China’s handling of the September 2010 incident with Japan was not solely an 
expression of unjustified assertiveness and nationalist pique, however. Although Beijing 
clearly overreacted, almost certainly in part due to domestic pressure, it was also 
responding to what it regarded as a clear departure by Japan from the status quo in 
handling such incidents. According to one deeply knowledgeable observer of Sino-
Japanese interactions, precedent (including an incident in 2004 and one in 2008) 
suggested that Japan would not have detained the Chinese fishing boat captain, but 
instead would have deported him to China. That is part of why the Chinese reacted so 
strongly to Japan’s actions: because they were unexpected.50 
 
 More broadly, the response of both China and Japan to specific incidents such as 
altercations involving gas fields in or near disputed territories and the collision of 
September 2010 are part of a competitive dynamic involving military and political 
activities in support of maritime sovereignty claims, made more sensitive by the presence 
of natural resources and nationalist public pressures. In this ongoing competition, both 
sides appear to engage in assertive behavior at various times, often in response to 
apparent “provocations.”51  
 
 At the same time, both sides exhibit restraint and undertake compromises at times. 
For example, both countries, but particularly China, also made significant compromises 
in order to conclude the 2008 agreement on joint development of resources in parts of the 
East China Sea. (Although, in the case of China, movement toward implementing this 
agreement has been stymied by domestic nationalist opposition that viewed the 
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agreement as too conciliatory.)52 Moreover, since 2004, China has tried to prevent 
Mainland-based activists from traveling to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
Likewise, Japan has engaged in similar behavior in an attempt to contain the potential for 
escalation.53  
 
 In addition, China’s assertiveness in handling maritime sovereignty and other 
incidents with Japan continues to remain subject to a larger political and strategic need to 
maintain or even deepen cooperative relations with Tokyo. It is clearly not in China’s 
interest to allow such incidents to escalate to the point where they can create serious 
damage to relations with a key economic partner and important geostrategic player in the 
Asia Pacific. The same holds true for Japan.54 Hence soon after the September 2010 
incident, China and Japan agreed to resume high-level bilateral contacts on a regular 
basis and reaffirmed the need for cooperation.55  
 
 As in its approach to the South China Sea, Beijing has not altered its existing 
strategy in the East China Sea arena, choosing instead to defer settlement and engage in 
political and diplomatic negotiation while defending its existing claims to disputed 
territory.56 At the same time, Beijing’s commitment to defend its territorial claims and 
seek energy resources, combined with its growing military capabilities and strong 
nationalist sentiments toward Japan, clearly suggest that, as in the South China Sea, 
managing its behavior in the East China Sea will likely prove increasingly challenging.  
 
The Exclusive Economic Zone: More Challenges to a (Growing?) 
U.S. Presence, and a Legal/Diplomatic Effort to Garner Support for a 
Minority View 
Legal and diplomatic statements and submissions 
In addition to the claims discussed above regarding maritime territories, the Chinese 
government has in recent years presented an interpretation of UNCLOS definitions of the 
rights of coastal states with regard to their EEZs that is viewed by many observers as both 
unconventional and assertive. In particular, since the early 2000s, Beijing has publicly set 
forth a minority viewpoint regarding “the right to draw straight baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured, the right to exercise innocent passage through 
the territorial sea by warships, and the right to conduct military surveillance activities in 
the . . . EEZ of the coastal state.”57 Most notably, the Chinese government argues that 
foreign military vessels must provide prior notification before entering an EEZ and that 
foreign military activities involving hydrography, surveys, and intelligence-gathering 
within the EEZ are illegal because they signify hostile intent and thus violate the 
“peaceful purposes” provisions of UNCLOS.58  
 
 The United States and an overwhelming majority of other nations do not accept this 
interpretation, however, arguing instead that such activities are not hostile and hence are 
not prohibited under UNCLOS. In particular, Washington asserts that although coastal 
states are granted jurisdiction over environmental and economic resource–related 
activities within their EEZ, nothing in UNCLOS or state practice restricts military 
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activities undertaken with due regard.59 Hence, some knowledgeable observers believe 
that Beijing’s position, if widely accepted, would result in “increased maritime 
instability,” and thus poses a threat to the status quo in the maritime realm.60 
 
Activities Presumably Undertaken in Support of China’s Claims 
From Beijing’s perspective, the above interpretation has provided a legal underpinning to 
the official statements and actions China has taken over the past decade opposing the 
activities of U.S. military platforms operating within China’s EEZ. Most notably, since 
late 2000, Chinese naval vessels and aircraft have repeatedly confronted U.S. military 
surveillance ships and aircraft operating in the waters and airspace of China’s EEZ,61 
resulting in at least one collision (the so-called EP-3 incident in April 2001) and several 
near collisions or close-by harassment (including the so-called USNS Impeccable and 
USNS Victorious incidents in March and May 2009 in addition to the trailing of the 
USNS Bowditch in 2001 and 2002), and in each case generating serious political crises.62 
 
 In addition, Chinese officials, and military officers in particular, have identified U.S. 
reconnaissance in China’s nearby waters as one of three obstacles to future positive 
advances in Sino-American military-to-military exchanges. Although not specifically 
identified as occurring only in China’s EEZ, there is little doubt that Beijing includes 
U.S. activities in such waters.63  
 
 While many outside observers regard China’s physical challenges to U.S. or other 
foreign military surveillance activities within China’s EEZ as a highly significant 
indication of increased assertiveness, from Beijing’s perspective, such activities 
constitute a legitimate and understandable reaction to what is perceived as hostile 
behavior. Equally significant, China’s more aggressive challenges in recent years were 
apparently prompted by increases in the tempo and intrusiveness of U.S. surveillance 
activities within China’s EEZ in response to the ongoing modernization of China’s naval 
forces.64 According to Chinese sources, Beijing repeatedly requested that Washington 
cease such increasing activities, apparently to no avail.65  
 
 Such Chinese justifications, whether based on accurate information or not, certainly 
do not justify often dangerous, close-in interceptions of U.S. aircraft and vessels, 
including apparent attempts to force U.S. vessels to cease their activities. Even if they are 
taken in response to enhanced U.S. surveillance along China’s coastline (arguably a form 
of “assertive” behavior in itself), Chinese interceptions can legitimately be regarded as 
themselves assertive, even aggressive in nature. Again, as in the case of other maritime 
sovereignty issues, China’s increasingly muscular behavior results in part from a 
combination of an increased capability to act in support of existing policies, combined 
with need to respond to perceived provocations by others. 
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The Yellow Sea: More Verbal Challenges of the U.S. and Allied 
Military Presence, but Apparently PLA-driven, and Subject to 
(Civilian?) Limits 
The final recent example of apparent Chinese assertiveness in issues of maritime 
sovereignty involves Chinese statements and actions in response to U.S. and allied 
military operations in the Yellow Sea near the Korean Peninsula. Most notably, in the 
summer of 2010, Beijing repeatedly criticized, using increasingly strong language, a joint 
military exercise (“Invincible Spirit”) to be staged by U.S. and Republic of Korea forces 
in the Yellow Sea near China and the Korean Peninsula, despite the fact that the exercise 
would occur in international waters, and that similar exercises have been held in the past 
without such Chinese protest.66 The U.S./allied exercises were intended as a signal of 
resolve and deterrence toward Pyongyang in the aftermath of the sinking of a South 
Korean frigate (the Cheonan) in disputed waters near the peninsula on March 26, 2010.67 
 
 In addition, Beijing also held several military exercises in the East China Sea and 
Yellow Sea, in the months of June and September 2010, respectively. Although described 
officially as “routine,” these actions were interpreted by some observers as unprecedented 
in nature and a direct Chinese response to the U.S.-ROK military exercises.68 Some 
observers also pointed to visits by two very senior PLA officers (deputy chairmen of the 
Central Military Committee) to the Shenyang Military Region and the North Sea navy 
base near the Yellow Sea in June 2010 as another indication of China’s response to the 
U.S. and South Korean exercises.69 
 
 In this instance, Beijing’s diplomatic statements were clearly triggered by U.S. and 
allied actions. In particular, the Chinese leadership apparently regarded the U.S./allied 
exercises in summer and fall 2010 as a potential threat to stability on the increasingly 
tense Korean Peninsula. They clearly did not agree with Washington and Seoul that such 
actions would stabilize the situation. Hence, from such a perspective, China’s behavior 
might be viewed as a one-time reaction to a tense situation. However, as indicated in 
endnote 68, Beijing’s increasingly strong diplomatic protest in this case was apparently 
not limited to the Yellow Sea. It specified opposition to foreign military vessels or planes 
operating “in China’s coastal waters” [authors’ emphasis]. The location of this area was 
not defined. Specifically, it is unclear, based on the official Chinese Foreign Ministry 
statements, whether Beijing was cautioning against exercises within its EEZ, or sought to 
include waters beyond its EEZ. Yet the very general language employed in the June and 
July statements strongly suggested that Beijing was objecting at that time to the exercises 
based solely on their proximity to China (i.e., in undefined coastal waters), and not just 
because the exercises might occur in China’s EEZ. Moreover, the linkage in the official 
statements made between “coastal waters” and “China’s security interests” suggests that 
Beijing’s concern was not solely based on the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula. 
Indeed, this more general threat perception is suggested by unofficial explanations for 
China’s protest to the exercises provided at the time by serving Chinese military 
officers.70 However, in November 2010, Beijing issued official statements objecting only 
to “any military activities conducted within China’s EEZ without receiving 
permission.”71  
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 What explains such variations in official statements? It appears that a combination of 
public attention generated by China’s unofficial media, along with commentary on the 
issue by retired military officers, and statements by senior generals, pushed the PRC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to adopt the increasingly strong language noted above 
to protest the U.S./allied exercises, and to characterize China’s objections on the basis of 
activities to occur in its “coastal waters” and not its EEZ. In early June, Huanqiu Shibao 
(Global Times), a newspaper with tabloid-like qualities, published a report from the 
Yonhap News Agency about upcoming U.S.-South Korean exercises in the Yellow Sea 
and then interviewed several Chinese military commentators, who described them as 
provocative. The report did not state where in the Yellow Sea the exercises would occur. 
It also published an editorial which stated that “emotionally, the Chinese people cannot 
accept the presence of the U.S. aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea.” The following day, the 
paper published the results of an online poll from its website, in which more than 96 
percent of respondents agreed that the exercises “pose[d] a threat to China.”72  
 
 In the weeks that followed, the story spread and additional military commentators 
like retired Major General Luo Yuan began to weigh in, expressing opposition to the 
exercise. Although the MFA on June 22 used moderate phrasing, stating that they were 
“following the development closely,” the PLA Deputy Chief of Staff (Ma Xiaotian) used 
much stronger language on July 1 during what appeared to be an impromptu interview on 
Phoenix Television. He asserted that Beijing was not merely “concerned” about the 
exercises, but “extremely opposed” (feichang fandui, 非常反对) to them because they 
were “close to Chinese territorial waters.”73  
 
 In a statement on July 6, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang stated, “We have 
taken note of the remarks of Deputy Chief of General Staff Ma Xiaotian. We will follow 
closely the situation and make further statements accordingly.”74 Two days later, the 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang used much stronger language that appeared to 
endorse the position articulated by Ma Xiaotian. He stated that China “resolutely 
opposed” (jianjue fandui, 坚决反对) the presence of “foreign ships” in the Yellow Sea and 
“other coastal waters [jinhai, 近海]” that would influence “China’s security interests.”75 In 
addition, in the above-noted statement of July 15, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin 
Gang also stated: “The Chinese public has also voiced their strong feelings. We will 
closely follow the developments of the situation.”76 
 
 Taken together, the above contextual factors suggest that although China was again 
reacting to what were viewed as potentially dangerous and provocative actions by others 
(in the form of nearby military exercises), it was also being more broadly assertive by 
couching its objection within a larger official stance of opposition to the conduct of any 
activities affecting China’s security and interests taking place in coastal waters (which 
overlap considerably with China’s EEZ). The episode was also propelled by the role of 
the media in stoking public opinion, which created an opportunity for military 
commentators to speak out on the issue, culminating in Ma Xiaotian’s July 1 interview. 
 
 However, China appeared to clarify its position in November 2010, in response to a 
further escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. After North Korea shelled 
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South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing several persons, and the U.S. and South Korea 
announced additional military exercises in response (which included the participation of a 
U.S. carrier), Beijing issued the abovementioned statement protesting only “any military 
activities conducted within China’s EEZ without receiving permission.”77 
 
 As suggested above, this focus on China’s EEZ appeared to constitute a more clearly 
defined and perhaps more legally defensible position. It also reflected some moderation 
from the stance taken in July. Beijing (or at least the Foreign Ministry) probably 
calculated that a repeat of the “maximalist” position presented in the summer would have 
proven excessively provocative to Washington and Seoul in that instance, given North 
Korea’s clear provocation, and the anger felt in the U.S. and South Korea over Beijing’s 
earlier prevarications concerning Pyongyang following the Cheonan incident. 
 
Conclusions and Prospects 
The foregoing analysis indicates that interpreting recent Chinese assertiveness with 
regard to maritime sovereignty claims and maritime periphery defense is by no means a 
simple and straightforward matter. On the broadest level, regarding its disputed territorial 
claims, in the past few years, China has not altered it basic, longstanding two-sided 
strategy of a) avoiding conflict while deferring the resolution of difficult disputes (such 
as those in the East China Sea and South China Sea) in favor of negotiation and cautious 
management (sometimes involving notable concessions), while b) maintaining a resolute 
defense against perceived attempts by others to undermine China’s diplomatic, legal, 
political, economic, and military position.  
 
 The first half of this strategy means that whatever assertive actions China might have 
taken concerning its maritime sovereignty claims, such actions have not constituted 
unilateral attempts to resolve a particular issue by force or otherwise reject a preference 
for negotiation. When possible, Beijing has attempted to maintain an emphasis on 
bilateral negotiation and avoid conflict.78  
 
 Apart from the 2008 consensus agreement for developing resources in the East China 
Sea, Beijing has not compromised in any outstanding territorial or maritime sovereignty 
dispute since it resolved the conflict with Russia over Heixiazi Island at the confluence of 
the Amur and Ussuri rivers in 2004. At the same time, China has demonstrated a growing 
willingness and ability to affirm its claims and to support its claims in new ways, in large 
part via an enhanced physical presence and more clearly defined legal and diplomatic 
statements. As shown above, this greater assertiveness stems from a variety of sources, 
including: 1) a greater ability to deploy more-numerous and in some cases more-capable 
air and naval assets of various types (both military and especially civilian) into or near 
disputed areas, thus increasing China’s capability and willingness to defend its interests; 
2) the emergence of new, more diverse, and highly active popular and elite media, along 
with a greater level of media freedom to comment on maritime sovereignty issues, thus 
increasing the speed, scope, and intensity of public scrutiny paid to disputes, resulting in 
greater pressure on China’s leaders; and 3) a more active stance (or specific 
“provocations,” from Beijing’s perspective) by claimants and/or other foreign entities 
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operating in China’s claimed territorial waters, EEZ, or even coastal waters beyond the 
EEZ, thus prompting what Beijing regard as a logical and necessary response, in order to 
defend its policies and prevent an adverse change in the status quo.79  
 
 In addition, the intensity of Beijing’s response (as well as, in some cases, actions that 
precipitate assertive government actions by both sides, as in the September 2010 Sino-
Japanese boat collision) are increasingly influenced by the more assertive behavior of 
growing numbers of subordinate governmental actors or even some nongovernmental or 
quasi-governmental actors, such as oil companies, fishermen, scientists, five maritime 
law enforcement agencies, and local governments. As we have seen, the Chinese military 
in particular is probably taking a more active and assertive stance toward maritime 
sovereignty issues, via both official and unofficial statements in the media and through 
the exercise of a quasi-independent level of control over many of the operational aspects 
of China’s military presence in the western Pacific.80 
 
 In looking toward the future, and taken as a whole, the above analysis suggests that 
China’s longstanding and deep-rooted two-sided approach to dealing with maritime 
sovereignty disputes is unlikely to change significantly in the near to medium term. 
Nonetheless, increases in China’s strength relative to other powers in the western Pacific 
(including, perhaps, the United States), combined with the emergence of more-assertive 
actors not entirely controlled by the central civilian government (including, most likely,  
/`the military), a more open and active media, and rising levels of national self-
confidence will together almost certainly increase the number and intensity of troublingly 
assertive behaviors by Beijing along its maritime periphery. Since most other countries 
involved in maritime disputes are much weaker than China, most of these incidents will 
be diplomatic and not military in nature. However, the potential for rapid escalation in 
some cases, and the arguably growing possibility that the U.S. might intervene militarily 
if coercion or conflict results, suggests that growing Chinese assertiveness over maritime 
sovereignty issues is arguably one of the most important potential causes of serious 
confrontation or even conflict between the U.S., allied powers, and China over the 
coming years. 
 
Appendix: 
Timeline of Actions of South China Sea Claimants Other than China 
Date Action 
2006–2007 Vietnam increases offshore petroleum exploration projects in waters claimed 
by China. 
January 2007 The Fourth Plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party’s Central Committee 
adopts a resolution mandating the development of a national ‘Maritime 
Strategy Towards the Year 2020.’ The strategy envisions that maritime 
industries, especially fishing and petroleum, would account for 55 percent of 
GDP in 2020, up from 48 percent in 2005. 
April 2007 Vietnam elevates Trường Sa (Spratly Island) to the level of a “township” 
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under the Trường Sa District. 
November 2007 The Philippine legislature begins debate on an archipelagic baselines law, 
which includes 53 features from the Spratlys as part of the Philippine 
archipelago.  
June 2008 The 2004 joint seismic survey agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam 
expires, dashing China’s hopes for “joint development” (Deng Xiaoping’s 
guideline for managing these disputes).  
February 2009 The Philippine legislature passes an archipelagic baseline law that includes 
claims to some of the Spratlys. The bill is signed into law in March 2009. 
March 2009 Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi makes a public visit to Swallow Reef, a 
feature in the South China occupied by Malaysia, to demonstrate Malaysia’s 
own claim. 
November 2009 Vietnam’s foreign ministry hosts a large international academic conference 
on the South China Sea to launch its campaign to “internationalize” the 
dispute. 
December 2009 The number of Vietnamese fishing vessels sheltering in the Paracel Islands, 
controlled by China since 1974, increases (many are detained by China). 
January 2010 Vietnam assumes the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and begins a public 
effort to build consensus within ASEAN on the South China Sea. 
March 2010 The Vietnamese prime minister makes a public visit to one of the 
Vietnamese-held Spratly Islands to demonstrate Vietnam’s claim. 
April 2010 Approximately 20 Vietnamese fishing and coast guard vessels surround a 
Chinese Fisheries Administration patrol vessel. 
July 2010 The United States and 11 other countries express concern about the situation 
in the South China Sea during the annual meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum. 
November 2010 Vietnam’s foreign ministry hosts a second international academic conference 
on the South China Sea. 
February 2011 The Philippines begins a seismic survey in the waters near Reed Bank. 
April 2011 The Philippines submits a note verbale to the UN contesting China’s claims 
from its May 2009 note to the UN. 
March 2011 Vietnam begins seismic surveys in waters claimed by China 
June 2011 Five legislators from the Philippines visit Thitu Island 
June 2011 Vietnam holds live-fire naval exercises in the South China Sea. 
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